Imperfect Knowledge
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Conference paper
The Contingent Expectations Hypothesis: Rationality and Contingent Knowledge in Macroeconomics and Finance Theory
Apr 2013
For macroeconomists, an individual is rational if she uses her understanding of the way the economy works in making decisions that do not conflict with her objectives.
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Conference paper
Rationality in the Present-Value Model of Stock Prices: Fundamentals, Psychology, and Structural Change
Apr 2013
The present-value model of stock prices is a workhorse in financial economics. The model relates today’s price of a stock (or a basket of stocks) to the market’s forecasts of next-period’s price and dividend, appropriately discounted.
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Conference paper
Forward-Rate Bias, Contingent Knowledge, and Risk: Evidence from Developed and Developing Countries
Apr 2013
In this paper, we examine one of the core puzzles in International Macroeconomics, the so-called “forward-discount anomaly.”
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Conference paper
The Econometrics of Imperfect Knowledge Economics
Apr 2013
A core premise of contemporary economic models is that researchers can adequately specify in probabilistic terms how individuals alter the way they make decisions and how the processes underpinning market outcomes unfold over time.
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Conference paper
Expectational coordination failures and Market outcomes’ volatility
Apr 2013
The first part of this text comes back on the standard economic viewpoint on expectational coordination, a viewpoint that the recent events have challenged.
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Conference paper
Endogenising Uncertainty
Apr 2013
Uncertainty is an unavoidable feature of economic life, although we may cope with it sometimes by ignoring it. Institutions, conventions and behaviour are all conditioned by uncertainty, and they in turn condition uncertainty in a reflexive manner.
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Time and Expectations in Economic Analysis
Apr 4, 2013 | 08:45—09:45
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Conference paper
Monetary and Financial Stability: Lessons from the Crisis and from classic economics texts
Apr 2013
My remarks today will be focused primarily on features of the developed world’s financial system which led to the crisis of 2008 and to the Great Recession that followed, from which we are only slowly and painfully emerging.
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Conference paper
Comments by William White on the Presentation by Lord Adair Turner
Apr 2013
In his recent lecture at the Cass Business School, Lord Turner noted that even mentioning the possibility of overt monetary financing was akin to breaking a taboo.
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Macroeconomic Policy and Economic Stability: Lessons of the Historical Experience with Fiat Money and the Implications for the Future
Apr 3, 2013 | 11:30—12:30
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Opening Models of Asset Prices and Risk to Non-Routine Change
Apr 17, 2012
Paper revised for the Institute’s Plenary Conference in Berlin
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Financial Instability Mini-Documentary
Apr 14, 2012
Financial stability, or the lack thereof.
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Conference paper
Financial Instability after Minsky:Heterogeneity, Agent Based Models and Credit Networks
Apr 2012
Albeit the majority of the profession either ignores Minskyís Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) or considers it plainly wrong, at least since the mid-80’s a few influential economists —who have certainly not embraced any unorthodoxcredo —have grown more receptive to this idea and eager to incorporate it in their models, even if diluted and sometimes disguised in order to make it more palatable to the conventional “representative” macroeconomist
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Conference paper
Andrew Haldane: Financial Arms Races
Apr 2012
Elephant seals have got too big for their beaches. A large specimen might weigh over 8000 lbs (3700 kg).Their size has a simple evolutionary explanation. Large males fight for the right to mate with a whole beach full of females. For elephant seals it is, quite literally, winner-takes-all. And the key to winning is simple – size.
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Conference paper
Real vs. Imagined Financial Markets The Regulatory Challenge
Apr 2012
We have grown accustomed to regulating financial markets based on imagined, not real markets. Real markets are shaped by and co-evolve with institutional arrangements within two fundamental constraints: Imperfect knowledge and the threat of illiquidity.