Working Papers

Globalization has improved the living standards of hundreds of millions of people – but growing resource scarcity means it risks becoming a victim of its own success.

Government intervention is often perceived as a constraint on market forces and thereby on economic growth.

All cultural narratives, worldviews, religious doctrines, political ideologies, and academic paradigms are ‘social constructs.’

At a time when China is the favored investment destination in the global market, it seems unlikely that it would ever face capital flight.

This is a small paper on a big subject: the polarization of American politics since the mid-1970s. In its early stages this process bore more than a passing resemblance to the opening scenes of a Grade B disaster movie: With almost everyone’s attention focused elsewhere, a series of tiny, seemingly insignificant departures from long standing routines took place.

The theme of this session is very timely and controversial, on the ability of sovereign governments to supervise Large Complex Financial Institutions (LCFIs), now officially described as G-SIFIs, global systemically important financial institutions.

After the inception and, hopefully, the passing of the most dangerous phase of the international financial crisis, economists have returned to the long favoured subject of global imbalances.

The presentation explains that Indian Economy is basically a market-oriented economy with constant rebalancing between state andmarket.

Many companies around the world have discovered they can benefit financially from integrating environmental, social and governance (ESG) targets in their daily operations and strategy.

Tonight I will talk briefly about the Keynes-Hayek relationship, then will focus on some of Hayek’s insights that may be of relevance today.

Central to John Maynard Keynes (1941) original Bretton Woods proposal was an international clearing union that would issue a new international currency by fiat called bancor. Among other functions, this international central bank would finance the stabilization of individual commodity prices through commodity buffer stocks.

For more than three decades, orthodox economists, policy makers in government and central bankers and their economic advisors, using some variant of old classical economic theory [OCET], have insisted that (1) government regulations of markets and large government spending policies are the cause of all our economic problems and (2) ending big government and freeing markets, especially financial markets, from government regulatory controls is the solutionto our economic problems, domestically and internationally.

It’s a singular honor to have been asked to deliver the Butlin Lecture. I first met Noel Butlin when I had the pleasure of visiting Australian National University for two months in what was, from my perspective, the summer of 1985.

Some questions can only be answered by educated guess. The question at the centre of this round table pertains to this category. We should not be ashamed of this kind of limitation of our capacity to predict the future.

In directing panelists to distinguish between what governments “can” and “will” do, this session’s title frames economic policymaking as a balancing act. Principled efforts to define and pursue the public interest are contested and repeatedly knocked off course by conflictingpersonal, bureaucratic, and political concerns that impinge on government decisionmakers.