History of Economics Playground

Professor Ponzi, or thinking about the methodology, the sociology and the economics of economics

I am writing from my notes. The event I want to report took place some two months ago, I have since been preoccupied, then occupied, and now increasingly overwhelmed. In the rooms of the Washington Duke Inn sat some 20 economists, philosophers, historians and methodologists, discussing "herding behavior" in the economics profession. I have been to several of similar events and they are spottingly attended, with folks coming in and out of the room, physically and mentally. Not so this time.

The experience was unexpectedly intense. All chairs were taken. Everyone stayed to the end. All were on target, despite the sunshine calling out to the golf course across the windows. (Perhaps, not many golfers in the room.) In two packed days, ground was covered, although no conclusion was sought or reached. Each participant riffed on the mandated topic of "herding" from their own disciplinary, personal vantage point. And there was not much space to discuss what fabric to weave from these threads.

Sitting on the sideline without having to present, it seemed to me that we know well about the powers of reproduction and emulation. We know the sociology of graduate schools and the economists' job market and we learn more and more about the structures that hold apart the elite of the American economics profession. We know of how fads and trends, and toolkits and themes spread across the professional literature. What still don't know much about is how the economists' wares are bought and sold.

On itself there is nothing really troublesome in economists sheepishly grazing the fields of orthodoxy. The trouble is that, like Monty Python explained many years ago, an ambitious sheep is that most dangerous of animals. 

Comic relief... oufff.

The problem that preoccupies the convenors of the workshop is to deconstruct orthodoxy and obtain a more open, pluralistic field of discourse. That's a very excellent goal. My puzzle is how do economists create research futures that are so convincing to their clients? To secure patronage, economists, like any other scientists, need to convince that their wares produce the intended outcomes: their metrics can photograph economic decision in motion, their theories depict the structures of a healthy economy, their policy blueprints yield progress and social justice in one stroke. Like Ponzi, are they making promises they can't keep, for the sake of staying in business?

Herds of economists bred for the service of other economists, is a local and professional perversion, but a herd that is sheperd by the anxieties and aspirations of their patrons and their polities is another, more scary matter.

Marion Fourcade and historians of economics: a quiet revolution?

In recent years, an increasingly significant part of the history of economics has modeled itself after the methodologies developed by Science and Technology Studies (STS) scholars. Accordingly, since I began working in the field as a graduate student, I have seen a lot of sociologists of science being invited at our conferences and our seminars. They presented their works, some of which having only indirect connections with economic subjects, and listened to what we have to say about the history of economics. In many ways, the pinnacle of this approach was reached with the 2009 HOPE conference at Duke University "The Unsocial Social Science: Economics and Neighboring Disciplines Since 1945", where historians and sociologists of many fields in social science came to write about the history of economics seen from the perspective of the other disciplines. These contributions were supplemented by other papers by people who have been trained and socialized within our community (for instance, Ross Emmett, Tiago Mata, JB Fleury and Teresa Tomas), even if for some of them, their recent works often go beyond the traditional boundaries of the history of economics. Still, when I see these kinds of interdisciplinary events, I am left with some questions about the reciprocity of these collaborations.

We value the works of historians and sociologists of science, but what do they think of us? Do they see us as these fools who still practice history as a disciplinary sub-field? Do they think that all the work that has been done in recent history of economics has created any valuable knowledge at all? And how do they perceive those who among us have tried to bring a more externalist point of view in the history of economics? This is in the light of these many questions that I particularly enjoyed reading Marion Fourcade's Economists and Societies, Discipline and Profession in the United States, Britain & France, 1890s to 1990s. In this book, Fourcade offers a very illuminating narrative about the way economics has been culturally shaped over the past century. By stressing national differences, she can subtly elaborate on the many ambiguities economists have entertained with political power, state interventionism and the changing of society in the period under scutiny. This is a very rich narrative, which would be worth commenting extensively, but here I do not want to focus much on the substance of her argument that on the way she makes her claims. Whereas Fourcade is mostly known as a sociologist and in her introduction asserts that most of her book is based on interviews, it must be said that a very significant portion of her work is actually historical in its content, and based on the reading of many previous works in HET, which she cites at length. Not only does Fourcade mention the more ore less recent "classics" (Blaug, Coats, Samuels, Goodwin, Weintraub, Mirowski, Morgan, Backhouse, etc.) but she also pays attention to the works of the youngest generation of historians of economics: for instance she cites Edward Nik-Kah and our Tiago guy is mentionned twice! Even more strikingly, she quotes from a working paper by Lise Arena, which was presented in 2008 at a workshop I attended and where Fourcade served as a guest speaker. In other terms, what is really striking in her book is how her extensive knowledge of HET is integrated into a coherent story of the professionalization of economists in the 20th century, whereas we usually see more differences than uniformity in the work that has been done in our sub-discipline. Therefore, her book could also serve as a nice, if quite unusual, introduction to recent history of economics and as such, it is a very promising work for those who think that good history and good sociology of economics should necessarily converge. 

So far so good. Now the bad news: a recent review article on Sylvia Nasar’s Grand Pursuit: The Story of Economic Genius by Orley Ashenfelter depicts Nasar's whiggish depiction of the geniuses of the past as a contribution to the history of economics, which, Ashenfelter argues, economists would gain by pursuing more in the future. In Ashenfelter's article, therefore, history of economics consists in reading the classics and giving it a spin and unsurprisingly, the paper does not refer to any serious work in the history of economics. If not for a reference to Ted Gayer's study of the place of HET in graduate studies in HOPE, you would think that the author has never opened a history of economic thought volume in his life! So here we are: endless possibilities and a whole new horizon if we address the SSK community, complete ignorance if we decide that we should remain economists. This is how sharp this dualism is. In the meantime, Fourcade's book should be worth reading for anyone. 

 

How God, Adam Smith, and the invisible hand changes over time

So with a suitably provocative title I think we can declare 2012 open. And in starting the year I was struck by how words and sentences can change in meaning over time, particularly prompted by this quote:

"No people can be bound to acknowledge and adore the Invisible Hand which conducts the affairs of men more than those of the United States."

It looks like an elegant statement of policy intent from a finely crafted presidential speech and we all know what it means. And it was exactly that, but the meaning may not be entirely clear when I tell you that the president was George Washington and the words were uttered in 1789. There is a lot of discussion of what the invisible hand means, or doesn't mean (e.g. Kennedy 2009), but lets stick with Washington and his first inaugural speech to Congress.

"In tendering this homage to the Great Author of every public and private good, I assure myself that it expresses your sentiments not less than my own, nor those of my fellow-citizens at large less than either. No people can be bound to acknowledge and adore the Invisible Hand which conducts the affairs of men more than those of the United States. Every step by which they have advanced to the character of an independent nation seems to have been distinguished by some token of providential agency"

Out of context it could have been any current president. With a little bit of context - here the surrounding sentences - it starts to become a very 18th century statement. That 'Great Author' or 'Providential Agency' is quite definetly a deity of some form, and then it is left to the rest of us to work out how Washington - who had a copy of Smith's work on the shelves - had read Adam Smith's expression of an invisible hand (or some previous reference to it). I'm partial to the religious side, but may have been swayed by Andy Denis (2005) - what do you think?

At Home in Economics

My friend read somewhere that the experience of death makes people think in philosophical terms. He might have thought of religion rather than philosophy, I replied. We agreed, and wandered off talking about our crypto-religious experiences in good old secular Europe. On my way back home, however, I wondered: what then makes people think in scientific terms? If it’s true that science can meet similar needs as religion does – for how else could some perceive a conflict between the two – one might ask: does the experience of death trigger an interest in science?

During my recent preparations for my history of economics class, I indeed stumbled over several people that entered the annals of economics and had rather difficult personal lives:

Frederic Bastiat (1801-1850): his mother, Marie-Julie, died when he was seven years old, and his father, Pierre, two years later when he was nine. As a child, Bastiat was said to be rather lazy, but would later grow into a strongly opinionated, if not a rebellious person. When he married Marie Hiard at age thirty, he separated right after the wedding, and later managed to keep a great share of his letters away from the public. Many readers might know that Karl Marx (1818-1883), begot seven children, having to watch five of them die. Heinrich Guido and Franziska died within their first year of life, and Edgar, his third child and first son, died at age eight - in his father’s arms, it is said. No need to remind how energetic Marx was in his professional life. Jenny Caroline, his first daughter, died shortly before he passed away. Gustav Schmoller (1838-1917), lost two brothers at the age of three, and his mother at age six. He had been a sick child and had spent some of his young years in cure. Schmoller, also, became a vigorous political activist in the creation of academic economics. Carl Menger (1840-1921), had a rather close relationship with Rudolf, the Crown Prince of Austria. In 1889, Rudolf first shot his lover, Mary, then himself – which came to be known as the Mayerling Incident. Apart from consequences on political history, Carl Menger was said to have been quite taken aback by this event, somewhat saddened, and became increasingly frustrated with the academic world. I also read of the rather difficult psyche of Menger’s son, Karl (1902-1985), who spent some of his childhood in a sanatorium and later found cure both in abstract art and in formal ethics. Francis Ysidro Edgeworth (1845-1926), was orphaned too. He lost his father at age two, and his mother at age four. Edgeworth also became what has been called a visionary scholar.

There are more recent examples of economists’ distressed lives, but my class has not yet advanced that far. Some might want to play down the one or the other destiny by referring to 19th century infant mortality rates and the like. Sure, the history of death is certainly not uneventful, but I dare to consider encounters of death, and that of family members in particular, at least challenging for most human beings at all times.

I don’t mean to generalize. Every single economist could make us reflect upon the individual sources that brought him to pursue his intellectual life in economics. How did they experience themselves so as to search for fulfillment in economics? Even though the intensity of personal ambition in economics can be historicized, as I tried elsewhere, an academic career requires quite some stick-to-itiveness that does not come from nowhere. Whence these forces? From the problems economists face in their societies? Perhaps, yes. But is the salvation of society the only satisfaction one can get from doing economics?

Economic science is not only a way of representing the world, and not only a way of talking to one another. It is also (excuse the expression) always already a way of dealing with oneself. Then, historians might read economic texts not as representations of the world – that has proven extremely tedious for both historians and practitioners – and perhaps not even as a discursive practice – as important this might be in light of the recent history of money – but as documents that tell us from the personal attempts to find some sort of harmony, some peace in one’s life – that is, as therapeutic practices. Sure, this can be applied to all sciences, but in particular to those that economize on representational and discursive content in their theories – such as economics.

Religion has always been therapy even before there was therapy, and it is obvious to make the same point about art. So why not science? In each single case mentioned above, the connection between their intellectual and private, or, inner-life is different and complex, and require greatest care of historians. But in all cases, economists, with great insistence, tried to “find home” in economics – ruminations while strolling back home.

Student discontent, teaching economics, and Robin Wells's suggestions for shifting our perspective: A historical case

On November 2nd, some Harvard undergraduate students walked out of Greg Mankiw's introductory economics course and wrote an open letter criticizing the biases inherent in the current teaching of economics.

On November 2nd, I was sitting in the Hayden Library Special Collection reading room at MIT, browsing archives on the undergraduate and graduate students' discontent during the early 70s and the response of the economics department faculty. Read more

Does econ blogging open new conversations (part II): lessons from Mike Konczal, Noah Smith, Mark Thoma and Milton Friedman

The INET roundtable on “new conversations and the academy” took place a week ago. Most panelists were bloggers, including Mike Konczal from RortyBomb and Noah Smith from Noahopinion. Read more

Roger Backhouse and Bradley Bateman: How can history stimulate new economic thinking?

[The following text was sent to us by Roger Backhouse and Bradley Bateman, we reproduce it in its entirety.] Read more

Backhouse and Bateman want Worldly Philosophers, not only dentists; not everyone agrees

Professors Roger Backhouse and Brad Bateman wrote an op-ed for the New York Times a few days ago, arguing that "thanks to decades of academic training in the “dentistry” approach to economics, today’s Keynes or Friedman is nowhere to be found" - we have stopped thinking big they say. Read more

Does Economics blogging open new conversations ? (Part I)

This is the question I'm supposed to answer for an experimental INET conference aimed at inspiring new thinking through interdisciplinary conversation and collective reflection without rules. Read more

Nobel Prize Tasseology

Till is right. It's not the historian's task to question the legitimacy of the decisions of the Nobel Committee. What he can do instead is “describe the culture in which credit is given.” For the Nobel prize does not only work as a canonization device. It also aims at establishing a genealogy of heros that fits the concerns of the days. In this perspective, “reading” and/ or “interpreting” this year's prize is less straightforward that many have argued. Read more